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Abstract
It is widely believed that the impact of fake news,
internet rumors, hoaxes, deceptive memes etc. are
spilling into the physical world from the virtual world.
In fact, social media has had a significant role in the
origination and spread of such deceptive
communication, as social media users often lack
awareness of the intentional manipulation of online
content and are easily tricked into believing
unverifiable content. In an increasingly polarized
world where social media and the internet have
pushed people to live inside “echo chambers” and
“filter
bubbles,”
people
consciously
and
unconsciously are exposed only to content that
reinforce their confirmation bias. In such a scenario,
people only agree with content that aligns with their
preexisting beliefs and disagree with or label as
“fake” content that is opposed to their worldview. This
paper proposes to study the psychological differences
that cause people to either agree or disagree with such
prejudiced and ideologically oriented online
disinformation.

1. Introduction
Disinformation, the English translation of the
Russian word Dezinformatsiya, was coined by Joseph
Stalin to ostensibly refer to dissemination of false
reports to mislead public opinion in the Soviet Union
by the West [51]. In contemporary usage, the
University of Michigan Library’s Research Guide
describes disinformation as deliberate, while
misinformation is the inadvertent creation and spread
of inaccurate information. The larger ecosystem of
mis-and disinformation is roughly of 7 types: satire or
parody, misleading content, imposter content,
fabricated content, false connection, false context and
manipulated content. In this paper we focus on
disinformation that is partisan, sensationalist and
inflammatory in nature, and designed to sway public
opinion towards political ends, deepen societal
fissures, pit one group against another, foment hatred,
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and incite violence. Such disinformation with an intent
to deceive is widespread.
In July 2016, the now defunct website
wtoe5news.com spread lies that Pope Francis had
endorsed Donald Trump in his bid for US presidency.
Allcott and Gentzkow [16] studied the phenomenon of
rampant disinformation that was circulated during the
2016 US Presidential elections but stopped short of
providing an assessment on the pivotal role it played
in electing one candidate over the other.
Disinformation not only affects political discourse but
also affects social discourse. During the same election,
North Carolina resident, Edgar Maddison Welch,
armed with an assault rifle, fired a shot at a
Washington DC pizza joint where he had come to
“self-investigate” an alleged claim that US
Presidential Candidate, Hillary Clinton, with her
campaign chief, John Podesta, was running a
pedophilia ring out of the restaurant [49].
Disinformation is not limited to the US – it has
worldwide ramifications. In Germany, during 2016,
there were false reports that a 13-year-old girl named
Lisa F of Russian origin was raped in Berlin by a group
of refugees from the Middle East. This news caused
hundreds to take to the streets in protest alongside far
right and anti-Islamic groups [50]. In Myanmar,
disinformation tinged with religious hatred was
circulated on social media, leading to violence against
the minority Rohingya Muslims by the majority
Buddhist population [50]. During the run up to the
European Union referendum in Britain, the Vote
Leave campaign bankrolled nearly a billion targeted
digital advertisements on social media, and among
them was an image of a bus painted with the slogan
“We send the EU £350 million a week,” which was
later found to be untrue [7]. In the Philippines, during
the 2016 presidential campaign, a blog named Mocha
Uson Blog, which previously used to provide sex
related advice, propagated disinformation in support
of presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte [41]. In
India, several Union Government Ministers have been
compelled to delete misleading tweets and posts after
being fact-checked online, and most such
disinformation “appear[s] to support India’s ruling
Bharatiya Janata Party and its right-wing Hindu
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nationalist agenda” [52]. Similarly, disinformation has
surfaced in Australia, Brazil, Italy and elsewhere. But,
disinformation or propaganda is not a new
phenomenon. It is almost as old as civilization itself.
In 13th Century BC, emperor Rameses the Great
spread falsehoods about his supposed victory in the
Battle of Kadesh against the Hittites, when the battle
was actually a stalemate [57]. In 1475 AD a Franciscan
preacher, Bernardino da Feltre, spread a rumor in
Trent, Italy, that the Jewish community murdered a
two-and-a-half-year-old child named Simonino and
drank his blood to celebrate Passover. This resulted in
the torture of the Jewish community, with 15 people
burned alive at the stake. These false “blood libel”
stories were responsible, in part, in laying the
foundation for anti-Semitism [35]. During World War
I, the Allied press was awash with false propaganda
about a supposed factory which extracted body fat
from dead German soldiers to manufacture
nitroglycerine, candles, soaps, lubricants etc. This
story on the “German Corpse factory” was later used
by Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, during
World War II, to deny the ongoing massacre of Jews
in Nazi concentration camps and described it as British
propaganda [6].
All these anecdotal accounts of online or offline
disinformation have an underlying consistency: they
were either ethnocentrically prejudiced or were
ideologically motivated. As a matter of fact, a
significant portion of disinformation and propaganda
that are in circulation online are politically motivated
and are propagated with the aim of political or social
polarization by appealing to our inherent and primal
prejudices. Such ideologically oriented and prejudiced
disinformation is not only consumed but also believed.
Contentiously, ideological orientation has had a very
controversial history in research on prejudice. The
controversy arises due to research that has consistently
found correlation between prejudice and conservatism
as if conservatives are the “designated villains” of
prejudice. Two reasons are forwarded for this
correlation between prejudice and conservatism: (a)
conservatism does not cause prejudice but prejudiced
individuals use conservative beliefs to justify their
prejudice, and (b) compared to liberals, conservatives
are more likely to see people themselves, as opposed
to economic and social conditions, being responsible
for negative outcomes, such as high unemployment
rate among blacks being a result of laziness. This is not
to say that liberals are not prejudiced. Research has
linked a covert form of prejudice, aversive racial
prejudice, to liberals where people avoid contact with
a racial outgroup or at most try to be polite [3]. In the
world of online disinformation this may have
significant repercussions. Vosoughi et al. [45], in a
cover story for Science, investigated Twitter rumor

cascades and concluded that falsehood diffuses
“farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly” than truth
on social media, as humans are more likely to spread
it than bots. Such disinformation on social media is
shared and consumed by both poles of the ideological
spectrum. But there is empirical evidence of an
asymmetry in the pattern of creation and propagation
of disinformation on social media. The Computational
Propaganda Project at the Oxford Internet Institute
found that on Twitter and Facebook, right leaning
groups shared the widest range of extremist,
sensationalist, conspiratorial, fake and other forms of
“junk” news, compared to all other ideological groups
put together in the lead up to the 2016 US presidential
election [54]. The Berkman Klein Center for Internet
& Society at Harvard University reiterates that during
the same election the “more insulated right-wing
media ecosystem was susceptible to sustained network
propaganda
and
disinformation”
and
the
“hyperpartisan, unreliable sources on the left did not
receive the same amplification that equivalent sites on
the right did [40].” This stark asymmetry in diffusion
of disinformation on social media along ideological
lines and the mature social psychology literature on
prejudice and conservatism encourages a closer look
at this unfolding phenomenon. Hence, our research
question is as follows: Do individual differences of
prejudice and conservative self-placement have an
effect on the perceived credibility of disinformation
that diffuses on social media? Hence, we examine the
psychological variables that determine why some of us
are more prejudiced and ideologically conservative
than others. However, disinformation diffusion in the
left-wing media ecosystem is equally noxious. For
instance, disinformation showing a photograph of
detained immigrant children separated from their
parents in orange jumpsuits at US borders shared by
the left leaning Occupy Democrats group [47] also has
the potential to further deepen the cracks in an already
divided society. Although, this paper focuses on only
one pole of the ideological spectrum, further research
that focuses on the opposite pole is also necessary.
Together, it may explain why we agree or disagree
with certain content even though they are outright
falsehoods and consciously or unconsciously allow
ourselves to be deceived by such content. The paper is
organized as follows. First, we briefly review the
literature on online deception and its detection. We
then provide the theoretical background and introduce
our conceptual model. We conclude by discussing the
implications.

2. Literature Review: Deception Detection
The boundary between traditional news and user
generated content is gradually blurring [59]. Modern
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technologies, especially mobiles, allow instant posting
and sharing of content, allowing people at the location
of an event to become de facto news reporters. Even
journalists themselves rely heavily on social media for
information, and 54% of all US news journalists
collect information from microblogging sites and
report their stories [5]. This means that a large
proportion of information that is consumed comes
from complete strangers rather than from trusted
sources [5]. Social media users have a general
disposition of goodwill towards social media
communication and are poor judges of the truthfulness
of content that they consume [31]. The content in
social media is often biased, unverifiable, subjective in
nature, and created and shared with the intention to
either attract online traffic for revenue or spread
outright lies to create false impressions or beliefs.
Thus, the potential for people to deceive by using
computer-mediated communication has grown
immensely with disastrous results [9]. Disinformation
is often political in nature to sway opinion, and the
impact is amplified as more and more people are
drawn to social media to receive content by sacrificing
caution for convenience [53]. In the US, 62 percent of
adults get their news from social media, according to
a Pew research study [19]. However, there is a
growing awareness among social media platforms to
look for tools to filter false content and reverse the
trend. For example, Facebook has taken steps to
identify news articles that are false and flag false
articles as “disputed by 3rd party fact-checkers” [1].
This entire phenomenon of disinformation can be dealt
with using the lens of the deception detection
literature. The literature is both technical and
behavioral in nature. As explained below, the technical
research effort has focused on automated detection of
deception, whereas the behavioral research effort has
focused on the development of theories that inform on
the psycho-sociological antecedents and consequences
of deception detection.
The literature on automated deception detection in
computer mediated communication can be broadly
classified into two categories viz. Linguistic Analysis
and Network Analysis. There are several successful
studies on deception detection that use linguistic cues
to identify deceptive communication, as the language
used by truth-tellers is different from that of deceivers.
For instance, Zhou et al. [25] reviewed several systems
for deception detection in textual communication and
identified 27 linguistic features classified under 9
broad conceptual clusters that are amenable to
automation for classifying texts as either deceptive or
truthful. Apart from linguistic analysis, Rubin [53]
notes that false content can be detected based on
“positioning of the message sources in the network,
their reputation, trustworthiness, credibility, expertise,

as well as propensity for spreading rumors” (p.12).
These techniques fall under the category of Network
Analysis. Liu et al. [58] proposed a technique to
automatically debunk rumors on Twitter in real time
by using verification features based upon insights from
journalists. However, in spite of the progress in
creating algorithms to detect false content, the success
rate has not been substantial, and human fact checking,
as done by Politifact and Snopes, is still more credible
in identifying false content, even though it is
expensive to employ human beings to sift through
huge amounts of data that flood the social media every
moment. Thus, Rubin [53] calls for a hybrid approach
to false content detection. She asserts, “When
analyzing social media for potentially deceptive
content, it is important to apply methods that consider
not just what is being said, but also how the message
is presented, by who, and in what format and context.
The hybrid approach should include text analytics,
network analysis and world knowledge database
incorporation to fully take advantage of linguistic,
interpersonal, and contextual awareness.” (p.22)
On the other hand, prominent theories and methods
have been developed to analyze deceptive discourse in
the behavioral stream. Such theories include ContentBased Criteria Analysis (CBCA) [2], Reality
Monitoring (RM) [30], Scientific Content Analysis
(SCAN) [26], Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT)
[10], Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) [46],
Leakage Theory [34], Prominence-Interpretation
Theory (PIT) [4] and Four Factor Theory (FFT) [32].
Despite the development of such theories on deception
detection, research has not been able to pinpoint a set
of reliable behavioral indicators of deception, and
investigation on behavioral cues such as posture shifts,
pupil dilation, gaze aversion, fidgeting, or foot and
hand movements haven’t led to much success. The
running average for thousands of participants, who
have participated in several deception detection
experiments conducted over the decades, reveals that
most participants are not very good at detecting
deception, with documented success rates of just 54%,
which is slightly better than chance [8]. Under these
circumstances, our paper focuses on an entirely
different set of attitudinal proclivities that may affect
deception detection accuracy, and the attitudinal
biases hinge on people’s ingrained belief systems.
Though social psychological constructs may not have
been explicitly investigated by deception detection
researchers, Schindler et al. [44] have shown the effect
of interaction between the Belief in Just World
construct, drawn from the Just World Theory [29], and
Mortality Salience construct, drawn from Terror
Management Theory [21], on deception detection
accuracy.
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3. Theory and Propositions
In developing our conceptual model, we draw
heavily from the social and political psychology
literature and the deception detection literature. We
specifically base our conceptual model on the
Expanded Prominence Interpretation Theory [18] and
contend that individual differences and situational
factors related to motivated social cognition play an
important role in assessing the credibility of online
disinformation.

3.1. Research Model: Expanded Prominence
Interpretation Theory (EPIT)
George et al. [18] developed EPIT as an extension of
the Prominence Interpretation Theory (PIT) of Fogg
[4] by supplementing it with another theory based on
the seminal work of Buller and Burgoon [10],
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT). The original
PIT theory was introduced after four years of
extensive research on website credibility at Stanford’s
Persuasive Technology Lab. The theory posits that
two things happen when people assess the credibility
of websites. The user first notices something
(Prominence), and then the user makes a judgment
about what was noticed (Interpretation). Initially,
Fogg [4] proposed that five factors affect Prominence:

(a) Involvement of the user, (b) the Topic of the
website, (c) the Task the user is performing, (d)
Experience of the user, and (e) Individual Differences.
Interpretation, on the other hand, is impacted by three
factors: (a) Assumptions in the user’s mind, (b) Skills
or Knowledge of the user, and (c) Context in which the
user operates. George et al. [18] added new factors and
modified existing factors that affect Prominence and
Interpretation, accounted for the temporal nature of
communication, and incorporated relationships among
Media, Credibility and Deception Detection. Even
though both PIT and IDT are process models, George
et al. [18] interpret EPIT as a causal model where
Interpretation acts as a moderator on the link between
Prominence and Credibility. They opine that the
relationship between Prominence and Credibility
holds even in the absence of a clearly articulated
Interpretation, as Interpretation may be conscious or
tacit. They also remark that the broad nature of EPIT
can potentially deal with any type of Credibility,
including Credibility of Information, as Credibility
essentially acts as a mediator between the upstream
construct of Media and a more general downstream
construct of Judgement. Figure 1 depicts an adapted
version of EPIT as proposed by George et al. [18] as a
state in the communication process at one point in
time.

Figure 1. Expanded Prominence Interpretation Theory (EPIT) at one point in time in the
communication process [18]
Since we focus primarily on whether certain
individuals than others are more likely to be deceived
by prejudiced online content, we restrict ourselves to

only Individual Differences that are linked with
prejudice and that may have a plausible effect on
Prominence, as well as a situational factor that may
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influence the relationship between Individual
Difference and Prominence. Additionally, George et
al. [18] have indicated that the antecedents to
Prominence are easy to measure and manipulate, but
Interpretation is particularly difficult to identify,
measure, and manipulate. Hence, our model only
considers how Individual Differences bias Prominence
moderated by a situational factor, and how
Prominence in turn impacts Credibility assessment,
while ignoring Interpretation (Figure 2). We now take
recourse to the social and political psychology
literature to argue that Individual Differences related
to prejudice and political conservatism are a result of
Motivated Social Cognition that conspicuously
influence how we interpret information that transgress
or bolster our cultural worldviews. Later, we also look
at a situational factor that heightens prejudicial
tendencies.

3.2. Motivated Social Cognition
Motivated Social Cognition or Motivated Reasoning
allows people to believe what they want to believe,
subject to certain reality constraints. Personal or social
goals and motives that people have affect their
reasoning, and they are likely to arrive at conclusions
that they want to arrive at. Human beliefs are
subjectively rational and are guided by both
directional and non-directional motives based on a set
of premises that the believers subscribe in [23].
Directional motives reflect the desire to reach a
predetermined conclusion, while non-directional
motives reflect the desire to arrive at an accurate
conclusion based on deep and careful cognitive
processing by reducing bias. If guided by directional
motives, people undertake a more intense search of
knowledge structures-- memories, beliefs, and rules—
to access only hypothesis confirming information, and
in process, suppress disconfirming evidence [60].
Only information that supports prior beliefs is readily
assimilated, and this information plays a rationalizing
and legitimizing role in the preservation of ideological
belief systems. Hence, people adopt ideological belief
systems such as Political Conservatism as it satisfies
their prior epistemic commitments and psychological
needs and motives.

3.3. Political Conservatism and Prejudice
The word ideology was coined by Antoine Destutt de
Tracy in 1796 during the Great Terror of the French
Revolution, a phase of the revolution punctuated by
unrestrained mob violence. Though initially a liberal
philosophy, Napoleon, after pretending to share the
liberalism with ideologists of Tracy’s National
Institute, later referred to them pejoratively as
"ideologues" when he consolidated power during the

early months of the French Republic [11]. Since the
time of the French Revolution, ideological opinions
have been classified most often in terms of a single
left-right dimension. In modern usage as well,
ideology predominantly has a unidimensional
connotation of a left-right divide, which has its roots
from late 18th century sitting arrangement in the
French Assembly Hall, where supporters of status quo
were seated on the right side of the Assembly, and
their opponents were seated on the left. In the United
States and other parts of the world, it has been
common to substitute “liberal” for “left” and
“conservative” for “right” [22]. Though this
unidimensional bipolar left-right model of ideological
structure has been criticized in the literature, and
multidimensional models of ideological structure have
been proposed, the parsimonious unidimensional
model has withstood the test of theoretical utility and
empirical validity. Conservatism and Liberalism have
consistently been shown to hold a negative
relationship in numerous factor analytic studies [22].
In this paper, we adopt the unidimensional model, and
we are particularly interested in the ideology of
Conservatism, as it has been linked with various kinds
of prejudicial dispositions both theoretically and
empirically.
Wilson
[13]
constructed
the
Conservatism Scale (C-Scale) and defined it as
“resistance to change and the tendency to prefer safe,
traditional and conventional forms of institutions and
behavior” (p.4). Jost et al. [23] identify two core
aspects of Conservatism. One core aspect is
traditionalism and an opposition to change. The other
core aspect is endorsement of inequality. These
inclinations of political conservatives are generally
associated with intolerance, prejudice, stereotyping,
and hostility towards a wide variety of outgroups
including stigmatized or disadvantaged groups. The
prejudices include racism, ethnocentrism, sexism,
homophobia,
anti-Semitism,
pseudo-patriotism,
classism,
disability
discrimination,
religious
fundamentalism etc. Surprisingly, different kinds of
prejudices often cluster together, and Allport [15]
combined them as “generalized prejudice.” He stated
that “One of the facts of which we are most certain is
that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject
other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely
to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group”
(p.66). Research over the years, grounded in theories
of personality, documents various individual
difference variables that predict the psychological
basis of right wing ideology and associated prejudices.
Certain situational factors also influence the
expression of Conservatism and prejudices. We now
illustrate the psychological and situational roots of
generalized prejudice and political conservatism that
we explicitly consider in our study. In terms of

Page 2746

Individual Differences, Right Wing Authoritarianism
and Social Dominance Orientation positively
influence prejudicial propensity, while Dispositional
Empathy and Polyculturalism negatively influence it.
Moreover, Mortality Salience is a Situational Factor
that moderates the relationship.
3.3.1. Individual Difference: Right Wing
Authoritarianism. The tradition of singling out right
wing rather than left wing ideology for special inquiry
started with the authors of The Authoritarian
Personality [48] in the backdrop of rising Fascism
throughout Europe leading to World War II. Later
there was a gradual loss of interest in this area due to
several methodological and conceptual issues.
Altemeyer [36] revived the interest by replacing
Adorno and colleagues’ [48] Fascism Scale (F-Scale)
with his Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale.
There are three distinct socio political attitudes of
Right Wing Authoritarians: (a) Conventionalism
defined as “a high degree of adherence to the social
conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by
society;” (b) Authoritarian Submission defined as “a
high degree of submission to the authorities who are
perceived to be established and legitimate;” (c)
Authoritarian Aggression defined as “a general
aggressiveness, directed against various persons,
which is perceived to be sanctioned by established
authorities” [36] (p.148). However, there has been
criticism that authoritarianism or dogmatism is also
associated with left wing extremism. Indeed, studies
on Russian samples show that authoritarianism is as
much a characteristic of the Communist left as is a
characteristic of the Western right [37]. However,
empirical evidence is unequivocally skewed in favor
of the “rigidity of the right hypothesis” [33].
Altemeyer [38] exclaims “authoritarian on the left has
been as scarce as hens’ teeth in my samples” (p.71). In
our western context we espouse this point of view.
Notwithstanding the criticism, RWA has shown
remarkable predictive power for generalized prejudice
and political conservatism. Since persons high in
RWA are generally prejudiced, discriminatory
towards outgroups, and are inclined towards
Conservative political orientation, we posit that they
will be more likely to agree with prejudiced and
ideologically
aligned
informational
content
irrespective of whether it is accurate or inaccurate.
Hence, we put forward our first proposition.
Proposition 1: Persons who are high in RWA will find
prejudiced content to be more credible, depending on
its Prominence in social media.
3.3.2. Individual Difference: Social Dominance
Orientation. Social Dominance Theory [12]
postulates that societal and evolutionary factors

determine the development of ideologically
conservative self-placements. The theory suggests that
human societies develop hierarchy-enhancing belief
systems that justify hegemony of the dominant group
over marginalized groups in order to minimize group
conflict. This is realized by promulgating various
“legitimizing myths,” such as (a) “paternalistic
myths,” which maintain that dominant groups are
indispensable to protect and lead subordinate groups
who are incapable of doing so by themselves; (b)
“sacred myths,” which claim that positions of
supremacy are a divine right determined by the
Almighty; (c) “reciprocal myths,” which proclaim that
there is a preordained symbiotic exchange between the
dominant and subordinate group that benefit each
other. These ideological devices allow the primacy of
one group over others in terms of economic status,
race, ethnicity, gender, etc., and hinder social change
in terms of equitable distribution of power, wealth, or
social status. While high RWAs “fear that authority
and conventions are crumbling so quickly that
civilization will collapse, and they will be eaten in the
resulting jungle,” people who score high on the Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale “already see life
as ’dog eat dog‘ and-compared with most people -- are
determined to do the eating” [38] (p.75) by becoming
“the alpha animal” [38] (p.87). Duckitt and Sibley [17]
reflect that “RWA should be more predictive of the
conservative, religious, traditional, clerical brand of
fascism characterized by Franco’s Spain, whereas
SDO should be more predictive of the aggressive,
dominative, militaristic fascism that was characterized
by Hitler’s Nazi party” (p.1878). Over the years, RWA
and SDO have together predicted an average of 50%
of statistical variance in generalized prejudice, and
Altemeyer [38] called them the “Lethal Union.” Like
RWAs, high SDOs are generally prejudiced,
discriminatory towards outgroups, and are inclined
towards Conservative political orientation. Hence, we
deduce that they will be more likely to agree with
prejudiced and ideologically aligned informational
content irrespective of whether it is accurate or
inaccurate. Thus, our second proposition follows.
Proposition 2: Persons who are high in SDO will find
prejudiced content to be more credible, depending on
its Prominence in social media.
3.3.3.
Individual
Difference:
Dispositional
Empathy. While studying other roots of generalized
prejudice, apart from RWA and SDO, McFarland and
Adelson [42] in an omnibus study reported gender to
be a significant determinant. Being male makes one
more prejudiced than being female. Individual
differences in gender reveal that females have higher
dispositional Empathy, while males have higher
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narcissism and masculinity. McFarland [43] studied
these factors and detailed that dispositional Empathy
was the third most important factor that predicted
generalized prejudice along with RWA and SDO, and
he termed them as the “Big Three.” Two primary
facets of empathy have shown to be antithetical to
prejudice: (a) “Empathic Concern,” which is a feeling
of sympathy and compassion for unfortunate others;
(b) “Perspective Taking,” which is a tendency to
spontaneously adopt the perspective or psychological
point of view of others [28]. Bäckström and Björklund
[27] used a structural model and found that differences
in Empathy, measured using subscales from Davis’
[28] Interpersonal Reactivity Index, primarily
explained individual differences in prejudice
stemming from sex differences. Compassion for others
doubtlessly makes one more likely to sympathize with
underprivileged outgroups and to appreciate their
concerns. Therefore, we extend our third proposition.
Proposition 3: Persons who are high in Empathy will
find prejudiced content to be less credible, depending
on its Prominence in social media.
3.3.4. Individual Difference: Polyculturalism. A
recent study by Rosenthal and Levy [24] investigated
the intergroup ideology of Polyculturalism and
communicated that Polyculturalism explained unique
variance in prejudice over and above RWA and SDO.
Polyculturalism was first proposed by historians
Kelley [39] and Prashad [55,56], and it holds
implications for racial and ethnic relations. People
who endorse Polyculturalism focus on how cultures
interact, influence and share ideas with each other and
have done so throughout history. They do not view
culture as static, unchanging entities that belong to a
particular group but instead as deeply connected and
shaped by mutual interactions among people. This is
different from the concepts of Multiculturalism and
Colorblindness. While Colorblindness de-emphasizes
group categories such as race, ethnicity, etc., and focus
on similarities among groups, Multiculturalism
emphasizes the distinctness of racial/ethnic groups and
focuses on understanding each other’s rich histories
and customs. Though Polyculturalism, like
Multiculturalism, recognizes racial and ethnic
differences, its principal focus is on the
“interconnections” among groups, unlike the focus on
cross-group similarities in Colorblindness. As Kelley
[39] puts it “All of us, and I mean ALL of us, are the
inheritors of European, African, Native American, and
even Asian pasts, even if we can’t exactly trace our
blood lines to all of these continents” (p. 81). Since,
Polyculturalism fosters positive intergroup contact,
greater interest in diversity, and greater appreciation
for differences, it has been shown to reduce prejudice

such as sexism and discrimination towards the
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex
(LGBTI) community. This leads to our fourth
proposition.
Proposition 4: Persons who are high in
Polyculturalism will find prejudiced content to be less
credible, depending on its Prominence in social media.
3.3.5. Situational Factor: Mortality Salience. Now
that we have looked at the Individual Differences in
the above sections, we turn our attention to a
situational factor that may influence the relationships
between Individual Differences and Prominence.
Allport [15] in his classical essay expressed that
prejudice is not rooted just in personality differences.
It is also influenced by a group’s specific history,
sociocultural setting, and situational factors. The
situational factor we canvas is Mortality Salience,
which has a long history in research related to
prejudice. According to Terror Management Theory
[21], fear of death is rooted in the basic human instinct
of self-preservation. This instinctive drive and an
awareness of the inevitability of death creates
paralyzing terror. Culture and concomitant
worldviews act as an anxiety buffer by which human
beings cope with this existential threat arising out of
the thoughts of one’s own mortality. To the extent that
this cultural worldview buffer allows human beings to
symbolically transcend death, the reminder of death
elicits strong negative response to events that violate
the cultural worldview and positive response to events
that uphold the worldview. Hence, salience of one’s
own mortality engenders defense and justification of
cultural worldviews and systems of meaning such as
religion and intolerance for alternative social or
political worldviews. Over time, research has
established that conservative thoughts and behaviors
are amplified under a heightened sense of terror
leading to more prejudice. Consequently, we submit
our fifth proposition.
Proposition 5: Mortality Salience interacts with, and
hence moderates the relationship between Individual
Differences and the Prominence of social media
content.
Our conceptual model is in Figure 2. In the model,
Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance
Orientation, Dispositional Empathy, and Endorsement
of Polyculturalism are the Individual Differences
which affect Prominence. Prominence mediates the
relationship between Individual Differences and
Credibility assessment. Mortality Salience moderates
the relationship between Individual Differences and
Prominence.
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Individual Differences

Right Wing
Authoritarianism

Mortality Salience

Social Dominance
Orientation

Prominence

Credibility

Empathy

Polyculturism

Figure 2. Conceptual Model

4. Implications
We have proposed a novel framework to study online
disinformation by marrying the literatures from
Deception Detection and Social and Political
Psychology. EPIT provides the foundation on which
we build our model, and we reckon that individual
differences may hold the key to understanding why
online disinformation spreads, and what makes people
so susceptible. As such, we broaden EPIT itself and
apply it in the specific context of prejudicially
motivated online deception. If our propositions are
empirically established, it may unlock new avenues
about how online disinformation is countered, and on
the downside it may provide ammunition to offenders
about how and whom to target with their malicious
content. We also introduce several scales from the
Social and Political Psychology literature which have
hitherto not been used in the Information Systems
discipline. As for other research in this area,
Pennycook and Rand [14] have investigated the role of
analytic thinking in the detection of “fake news,” and
they have shown that right leaning individuals who
supported one US Presidential candidate over the other
engaged in less analytical thinking and were less able
to detect fake from real news, compared to left leaning
individuals who supported the rival. But ours is a
larger perspective. We do not restrict ourselves to
political party or candidate affiliations but deal with
broader conceptions of prejudice and conservatism.
But, this is only half of the story. Here we ignore the
linkage between prejudice and liberalism, and the

disinformation campaigns that also plague the left
leaning media ecosystem. This calls for further
research that restores parity. As Greenberg and Jonas
[20], in their rejoinder to Jost et al. [23], had aptly
reminded, “psychological theorizing and research on
political attitudes always run the risk of being guided
by the motivated social cognition of the theorists and
researchers on the basis of their own sociopolitical
views,” and there should be a “counterweight toward
balance and diversity in the application of motivated
social cognition to understanding the determinants of
political orientation.”
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